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STABLE SCHEDULE MATCHINGS BY A FIXED POINT
METHOD
VILMOS KOMORNIK, ZSOLT KOMORNIK, AND CHRISTELLE K. VIAUROUX
Abstract. We generalize several schedule matching theorems of Baiou–Ba-
linski (Math. Oper. Res., 27 (2002), 485) and Alkan–Gale (J. Econ. Th. 112
(2003), 289) by applying a fixed point method of Fleiner (Math. Oper. Res.,
28 (2003), 103). Thanks to a more general construction of revealing choice
maps we develop an algorithm to solve rather complex matching problems.
The flexibility and efficiency of our approach is illustrated by various exam-
ples. We also revisit the mathematical structure of the matching theory by
comparing various definitions of stable sets and various classes of choice maps.
We demonstrate, by several examples, that the revealing property of the choice
maps is the most suitable one to ensure the existence of stable matchings; both
from the theoretical and the practical point of view.
1. Introduction
Since the pioneering paper of Gale and Shapley [8] on stable matchings, many
studies have been devoted to the adaptations and the generalizations of their algo-
rithm. Stable matching algorithms have found use in diverse economic applications
ranging from labor markets to college admissions or even kidney exchanges.
In these two-sided matching markets, two sets of agents have preferences over
the opposite set: on one side of the market, there are individuals (students, interns
or employees) and on the other side there are institutions (colleges, hospitals or
firms). A “stable match” is realized when all agents have been matched with the
opposite side such that neither could obtain a more mutually beneficial match on
their own.
The original strict preference ordering assumptions proved to be too restric-
tive for many real world problems. Following an influential contribution of Kelso
and Crawford [4], Roth [11] made a systematic study of a more flexible approach
based on choice functions. The monograph of Roth and Sotomayor [13] provides
an overview of the state of the art up to 1990 and it still serves as an excellent
introduction to the subject. Feder [6], Subramanian [14] and Adachi [1] discovered
a close relationship between stable matchings and fixed points of set-valued maps.
Then Fleiner [7] demonstrated that many classical results may be obtained by a
straightforward application of an old theorem of Knaster [10] and Tarski [15], [16].
See also Hatfield and Milgrom [9] for an economically motivated presentation of the
fixed point method.
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More recently, Baiou and Balinski [3] introduced the notion of schedule matching
which made it possible to consider, as a part of the contract not only the hiring of a
particular worker by a particular firm, but also the number of hours of employment
of the worker in the firm. In their setting, “stability” means that no pair of opposite
agents can increase their hours together either due to unused capacity or by giving
up hours with less desirable partners. They assumed that all agents have strict
preference orderings. Alkan and Gale [2] extended their model by using incomplete
revealed preference ordering via choice functions instead.
In this paper, we generalize the notion of schedule matching of Baiou and Balinski
[3] to allow for schedule and preference constraints on each side of the market. We
define a revealing choice map for each agent on the acceptable opposite side agent(s),
possible days and (combinations of) restrictions or “subsets” placed on the opposite
side agent and/or days worked. In particular, our framework allows for possible
quotas placed by workers on firms and days worked, allowing him to work part-time
for different firms on the same day or on different days, excluding some firms on
some given days or excluding some days of work. In the same manner, it allows
firms to adjust their labor force on certain days depending on their anticipated
activity, or on the requirements associated to different activities on different days
(or the same day). We show that the allocation of days, firms and workers is
stable in the sense that given their schedule constraints, their preference orderings
and constraints, there is no better schedule for both parties; moreover the stable
allocation is shown to be worker optimal or firm optimal. This is done by using a
slightly simplified version of Fleiner’s theorem and by giving a general construction
of choice maps having the revealed preference property. We illustrate the power
of our theorems by several examples. We provide the algorithm that can be used
to obtain the optimal allocation: we will solve a deliberately complex example to
explain its technical execution. Furthermore, in order to discuss the optimality of
our results, we clarify the relationships between various properties of choice maps
and between different definitions of stable sets, often used in the literature.
The plan of the paper is the following. In Section 2 we formulate a model
problem which will motivate our research and which may have natural real-word
applications. In Section 3 we present the mathematical framework for our model.
In Section 4 we solve the problems of Section 2 and we also explain how our results
cover some of the theorems of Alkan and Gale [2]. In Section 5 we illustrate the
power and flexibility of our method by solving a number of more complex problems.
Section 6 concludes. The proofs of the theoretical results are given in Section 7.
2. Schedule matching problems
In order to illustrate the novelty of the present work we begin by recalling the
first example of Gale and Shapley [8]. They considered three women: w1, w2,
w3 and three men: f1, f2, f3 with the following preference orders (we change the
notations for consistence with our later examples):
• Preference order of w1: f1 ≻ f2 ≻ f3;
• Preference order of w2: f2 ≻ f3 ≻ f1;
• Preference order of w3: f3 ≻ f1 ≻ f2;
• Preference order of f1: w2 ≻ w3 ≻ w1;
• Preference order of f2: w3 ≻ w1 ≻ w2;
• Preference order of f3: w1 ≻ w2 ≻ w3.
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They looked for the possibilities of marrying all six people in a stable way.
Instability would occur if there were a woman and a man, not married to each
other who would prefer each other to their actual mates. It turns out that there
are three solutions:
• each woman gets her first choice: (w1, f1), (w2, f2), (w3, f3);
• each man gets his first choice: (w1, f3), (w2, f1), (w3, f2);
• everyone get her or his second choice: (w1, f2), (w2, f3), (w3, f1).
Now let us modify the problem to a simple job market problem as follows. Con-
sider three workers: w1, w2, w3 and three firms: f1, f2, f3 with the same preference
orders for hiring as above. Furthermore, assume that hiring is for two different days:
d1, d2, with the following additional preferences and requirements:
• for each worker–firm pair (wi, fj), the worker prefers d1 to d2 and the firm
prefers d2 to d1;
• each worker may be hired by at most one firm on each given day (maybe
different firms on different days);
• each firm may hire at most two workers per day; if they hire two workers
for one given day, then they cannot hire anybody for the other day;
• no firm may hire the same worker for both days.
We are looking for a stable set of contracts, i.e., for a set S of triplets (wi, fj, dk)
having the following properties:
• each contract (wi, fj, dk) ∈ S is acceptable for both wi and fj ;
• for any other contract (wi, fj , dk) /∈ S, either wi and/or fj prefers her/his
contracts in S to this new one.
The following section presents the theory necessary to address this type of prob-
lems. The solution to this example is given in Section 4.
3. Existence of stable schedule matchings
In this section we develop the theoretical framework required to solve problems
like that of the preceding section. The main results are Theorems 3.7, 3.10 and
3.13. Propositions 3.5 and 3.6 contain useful complements and will be used in the
proof of Theorem 3.7 but they are not necessary for the understanding and the
applications of our theorems. For the reader’s convenience, proofs are postponed to
Section 6, which contains various remarks and examples discussing the optimality
of the results formulated here.
Given a set X , we denote by 2X the set of all subsets of X . By a choice map in
X we mean a function C : 2X → 2X satisfying
C(A) ⊂ A for all A ⊂ X. (3.1)
In economic applications X is the set of all possible contracts, and for a given
set A of proposed contracts, C(A) denotes the set of accepted contracts by some
given rules of the market.
Assume that there are two competing sides, for example workers and firms and
correspondingly two choice functions CW , CF : 2
X → 2X .
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Definition 3.1. A set S of contracts is said to be stable if there exist two sets
SW , SF ⊂ X satisfying the following three conditions:
SW ∪ SF = X ; (3.2)
CW (A) = S for every S ⊂ A ⊂ SW ; (3.3)
CF (A) = S for every S ⊂ A ⊂ SF . (3.4)
Stable contract sets represent acceptable compromises.
Remark 3.2. A stable set1 S is individually rational if
CW (S) = S = CF (S), (3.5)
and it is not blocked by any other contract, i.e., for each x ∈ X we have
either CW (S ∪ {x}) = S or CF (S ∪ {x}) = S (or both). (3.6)
In order to ensure the existence of stable sets of contracts we need one additional
assumption on the choice maps.
Definition 3.3. We say that a choice map C : 2X → 2X is revealing (or satisfies
the revealed preference condition) if
A,B ⊂ X and C(A) ⊂ B =⇒ A ∩ C(B) ⊂ C(A). (3.7)
This means that if a contract is rejected from some proposed set A of contracts,
then it will also be rejected from every other proposed set B which contains the
accepted contracts.
Example 3.4.
(a) For any fixed set Y ⊂ X the formula C(A) := A ∩ Y defines a revealing
choice map on X . This example illustrates a situation where some contracts are
unacceptable to certain agents.
(b) More generally, given a finite subset Y ⊂ X , a nonnegative integer q (called
quota) and a strict preference ordering y1 ≻ y2 ≻ · · · on Y , we define a map C(A)
for any given A ⊂ X as follows. If Card(A∩Y ) ≤ q, then we set C(A) := A∩Y . If
Card(A∩Y ) ≻ q, then let C(A) be the set of the first q elements of A∩Y according
to the ordering of Y . Then C : 2X → 2X is a revealing choice map on X .
Choice maps of this kind are frequently used in classical matching problems such
as the marriage problem, the college admission problem and various many-to-many
matching problems; see, e.g., [2], [13] and the references of the latter.
Before stating our main theorem, we further clarify the relationships between the
revealed preference condition and other usual properties of choice maps (Proposition
3.5.). We also discuss alternative equivalent definitions of stable sets (Proposition
3.6.).
Proposition 3.5.
(a) A choice map C : 2X → 2X is revealing if and only if it is consistent:
C(A) ⊂ B ⊂ A =⇒ C(B) = C(A) (3.8)
and persistent (or satisfies the substitute condition):
A ⊂ B =⇒ A ∩ C(B) ⊂ C(A). (3.9)
1A more thorough investigation of stable sets is carried out in Proposition 3.6 below.
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(b) A choice map is persistent if and only if the rejection map R : 2X → 2X
defined by R(A) := A \ C(A) is monotone, i.e.,
A ⊂ B =⇒ R(A) ⊂ R(B). (3.10)
(c) A choice map satisfying either (3.8) or (3.9) is idempotent:
C(C(A)) = C(A) for all A ⊂ X. (3.11)
Proposition 3.6. We consider two choice maps CW , CF : 2
X → 2X and three sets
S, SW , SF ⊂ X satisfying
SW ∪ SF = X and CW (SW ) = S = CF (SF ). (3.12)
(a) If the choice maps CW , CF : 2
X → 2X are idempotent, then S is individually
rational, i.e., it satisfies (3.5).
(b) If at least one of the two choice maps CW , CF : 2
X → 2X is consistent, then
we may modify SW or SF such that that SW ∩ SF = S and (3.12) remains valid.
(c) If, moreover, both choice maps are consistent, then (3.12) is equivalent to
the stability (3.2)–(3.4) of S.
(d) If both choice maps CW , CF : 2
X → 2X are revealing, then a set S is stable
if and only if it is individually rational, and it is not blocked by any other contract,
i.e., (3.2)–(3.4) are equivalent to (3.5)–(3.6) (for all x ∈ X.
Observe that property (3.12) below follows from the definition of stable sets.
Our main theorem below shows that the revealed preference condition ensures
the existence of stable sets of contracts:
Theorem 3.7. If CW , CF : 2
X → 2X are two revealing choice maps, then there
exists at least one stable set of contracts.
Remark 3.8.
(a) The proof of the theorem, provided in Section 7, will show that the stable
sets form a complete lattice for a natural order relation. In particular, there exists
a worker-optimal and a firm-optimal stable set.
(b) In case X is a finite set, the proof of the theorem provides an efficient
algorithm to find a stable set. Starting with X0 := X we compute successively
Y1, X2, Y3, X4, . . . by using the recursive formulae
Yn+1 := (X \Xn) ∪ CW (Xn) and Xn+1 := (X \ Yn) ∪ CF (Yn).
There exists a first index n ≥ 1 such that Xn−1 = Xn+1, and then S := CW (Xn−1)
is the worker-optimal stable set.
Similarly, starting with Y0 := X we may compute successively X1, Y2, X3, Y4, . . .
by the same recursive formulae. There exists a first index n ≥ 1 such that Yn−1 =
Yn+1, and then S := CF (Yn−1) is the firm-optimal stable set. See Remark 7.2
below for the details.
(c) The definitions of revealing choice maps, stable sets, the theorem and the
preceding remarks remain valid if we replace 2X by a complete sublattice L of 2X ,
i.e., a subfamily L of 2X such that the union and the intersection of any system of
sets A ∈ L still belongs to L. See, e.g., [7] for more details on lattice properties.
(d) Part (a) of Proposition 3.5 shows that Theorem 3.7 is mathematically equiv-
alent to a theorem of Fleiner [7].
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(e) We will show in Examples 7.1 (a)–(b) and 7.5 of Section 6 that the revealing
condition cannot be weakened in Theorem 3.7.
In order to apply Theorem 3.7 for the solution of the problem stated in Section
2, we need a generalization of the construction of revealing choice maps recalled in
Example 3.4. Such a construction is provided by Theorem 3.10 below.
Let we are given a finite subset Y ⊂ X , a family {Yn} of subsets Yn ⊂ X , and
corresponding nonnegative integers (called quotas) q and qn. We assume that the
sets Yn ∩ Y are disjoint. Furthermore, let be given a strict preference ordering
y1 ≻ y2 ≻ · · · on Y . Given any set A ⊂ X , we define a nondecreasing sequence
C0(A) ⊂ C1(A) ⊂ · · · of subsets of A ∩ Y by recursion as follows. First we set
C0(A) = ∅. If Ck−1(A) has already been defined for some k, then we set Ck(A) :=
Ck−1(A) ∪ {yk} if
yk ∈ A,
CardCk−1(A) < q,
Card (Ck−1(A) ∩ Yn) < qn if yk ∈ Yn;
otherwise we set Ck(A) := Ck−1(A). Finally, we define C(A) := ∪Ck(A).
Remark 3.9. It follows from the construction that
C(A) ⊂ A ∩ Y ; (3.13)
CardC(A) ≤ q; (3.14)
Card (C(A) ∩ Yn) ≤ qn for all n. (3.15)
Theorem 3.10. C : 2X → 2X is a revealing choice map.
Remark 3.11.
(a) If qn ≥ q or qn ≥ Card(Y ) for some n, then we may eliminate Yn and qn
without changing the construction.
(b) If there are no sets Yn, then our construction reduces to Example 3.4 (b).
(c) If, moreover, q ≥ Card(Y ), then our construction reduces to Example 3.4
(a). (In this case the choice of the order relation is irrelevant.)
(d) Instead of a finite subset Y ⊂ X , we can also consider arbitrary subsets
Y ⊂ X with a well-ordered preference relation: the construction and the
proof of the proposition remain valid.
Example 3.12. The disjointness condition is necessary. To show this, consider the
sets X = Y = {a, b, c}, Y1 = {a, b}, Y2 = {b, c} with the quotas q = 2, q1 = q2 = 1
and the preference order a ≻ b ≻ c. Then for A = {b, c} and B = {a, b, c} we have
C(A) = {b} and C(B) = {a, c}, so that A ⊂ B but A ∩ C(B) 6⊂ C(A).
Theorem 3.10 can be often used for the construction of individual revealing choice
functions. The following result enables us to combine individual revealing choice
functions into global revealing choice functions.
Theorem 3.13. Given a set function C : 2X → 2X and a partition X = ∪Xi
with disjoint sets Xi, we define the set functions Ci : 2
Xi → 2Xi by the formula
Ci(Ai) := C(Ai) ∩Xi. Then C is a revealing choice map on X if and only if each
Ci is a revealing choice map on Xi.
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4. Solution to the simple job market problem
For the solution we set
W := {w1, w2, w3}, F := {f1, f2, f3}, D := {d1, d2}
and we proceed in several steps.
Step 1. For each fixed worker wi we define a revealing choice map Cwi on
{wi} × F × D by applying Theorem 3.10 with Y , q, Yn and qn given below. For
brevity we write (i, j, k) instead of (wi, fj , dk) in the preference relations.
• For worker w1 we choose
Y := {w1} × {f1, f2, f3} × {d1, d2},
Y1 := {w1} × {f1, f2, f3} × {d1},
Y2 := {w1} × {f1, f2, f3} × {d2}
with quotas q = 6 (which is ineffective), q1 = q2 = 1 and the following
preference relation on Y :
(1, 1, 1) ≻ (1, 1, 2) ≻ (1, 2, 1) ≻ (1, 2, 2) ≻ (1, 3, 1) ≻ (1, 3, 2).
• For worker w2 we choose
Y := {w2} × {f1, f2, f3} × {d1, d2},
Y1 := {w2} × {f1, f2, f3} × {d1},
Y2 := {w2} × {f1, f2, f3} × {d2}
with quotas q = 6, q1 = q2 = 1 and the following preference relation on Y :
(2, 2, 1) ≻ (2, 2, 2) ≻ (2, 3, 1) ≻ (2, 3, 2) ≻ (2, 1, 1) ≻ (2, 1, 2).
• For worker w3 we choose
Y := {w3} × {f1, f2, f3} × {d1, d2},
Y1 := {w3} × {f1, f2, f3} × {d1},
Y2 := {w3} × {f1, f2, f3} × {d2}
with quotas q = 6, q1 = q2 = 1 and the following preference relation on Y :
(3, 3, 1) ≻ (3, 3, 2) ≻ (3, 1, 1) ≻ (3, 1, 2) ≻ (3, 2, 1) ≻ (3, 2, 2).
Step 2. Applying Theorem 3.13 we combine the three choice maps of the pre-
ceding step into a global revealing choice map CW on W × F ×D by setting
CW (A) :=
3⋃
i=1
Cwi (A ∩ ({wi} × F ×D))
for every A ⊂W × F ×D.
Step 3. For each firm fj we define a revealing choice map Cfj onW×{fj}×D by
applying Theorem 3.10 with Y , q, Yn and qn given below and still writing (i, j, k)
instead of (wi, fj, dk) for brevity.
8 VILMOS KOMORNIK, ZSOLT KOMORNIK, AND CHRISTELLE K. VIAUROUX
• For firm f1 we choose
Y := {w1, w2, w3} × {f1} × {d1, d2},
Y1 := {w1} × {f1} × {d1, d2},
Y2 := {w2} × {f1} × {d1, d2},
Y3 := {w3} × {f1} × {d1, d2},
with quotas q = 2, q1 = q2 = q3 = 1 and the following preference relation
on Y :
(2, 1, 2) ≻ (2, 1, 1) ≻ (3, 2, 2) ≻ (3, 2, 1) ≻ (1, 3, 2) ≻ (1, 3, 1).
• For firm f2 we choose
Y := {w1, w2, w3} × {f2} × {d1, d2},
Y1 := {w1} × {f2} × {d1, d2},
Y2 := {w2} × {f2} × {d1, d2},
Y3 := {w3} × {f2} × {d1, d2},
with quotas q = 2, q1 = q2 = q3 = 1 and the following preference relation
on Y :
(3, 2, 2) ≻ (3, 2, 1) ≻ (1, 2, 2) ≻ (1, 2, 1) ≻ (2, 2, 2) ≻ (2, 2, 1).
• For firm f3 we choose
Y := {w1, w2, w3} × {f3} × {d1, d2},
Y1 := {w1} × {f3} × {d1, d2},
Y2 := {w2} × {f3} × {d1, d2},
Y3 := {w3} × {f3} × {d1, d2},
with quotas q = 2, q1 = q2 = q3 = 1 and the following preference relation
on Y :
(1, 3, 2) ≻ (1, 3, 1) ≻ (2, 3, 2) ≻ (2, 3, 1) ≻ (3, 3, 2) ≻ (3, 3, 1).
Step 4. Applying Theorem 3.13 we combine the three choice maps of the pre-
ceding step into a global revealing choice map CF on W × F ×D by setting
CF (A) :=
3⋃
j=1
Cfj (A ∩ (W × {fj} ×D)) , A ⊂W × F ×D.
Step 5. The choice maps CW and CF satisfy the hypotheses of Theorem 3.7. We
apply the algorithm as described in Remark 3.8 (b) by starting with X0 := X and
computing Y1, X2, Y3, X4 by the formulae
Yn+1 := (X \Xn) ∪ CW (Xn) and Xn+1 := (X \ Yn) ∪ CF (Yn).
We obtain that X2 = X4 and therefore S = CW (X2). The results are summarized
in the following table:
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wi fj dk X0 Y1 X2 Y3 X4 S
1 1 1 x x x
1 1 2 x x x x x x
1 2 1 x x x x x
1 2 2 x x x
1 3 1 x x x
1 3 2 x x x
2 1 1 x x x
2 1 2 x x x
2 2 1 x x x
2 2 2 x x x x x x
2 3 1 x x x x x
2 3 2 x x x
3 1 1 x x x x x
3 1 2 x x x
3 2 1 x x x
3 2 2 x x x
3 3 1 x x x
3 3 2 x x x x x x
In this worker-optimal solution each worker is hired by the second most preferred
firm for the first day and by the most preferred firm for the second day.
Step 6. Applying the algorithm of Remark 3.8 (b) by starting with Y0 := X
and computing X1, Y2, X3, Y4 by the above formulae we obtain that Y2 = Y4 and
therefore S = CF (Y2). The results are summarized in the following table:
wi fj dk Y0 X1 Y2 X3 Y4 S
1 1 1 x x x
1 1 2 x x x
1 2 1 x x x
1 2 2 x x x x x x
1 3 1 x x x x x
1 3 2 x x x
2 1 1 x x x x x
2 1 2 x x x
2 2 1 x x x
2 2 2 x x x
2 3 1 x x x
2 3 2 x x x x x x
3 1 1 x x x
3 1 2 x x x x x x
3 2 1 x x x x x
3 2 2 x x x
3 3 1 x x x
3 3 2 x x x
In this firm-optimal solution each firm hires the most preferred worker for the
first day and by the second most preferred worker for the second day.
Remark 4.1. The stable schedule matchings as studied by Baiou and Balinski [3]
and Alkan and Gale [2] enter the present framework as a special case. For simplicity
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we consider the discrete case and we denote by D = {1, 2, . . .} the possible number
of working hours with k meaning the kth working hour. For each worker wi, if
there is a preference ranking fj1 ≻ fj2 ≻ · · · among the firms, then we extend it to
the preference ranking
(i, j1, 1) ≻ (i, j1, 2) ≻ · · · ≻ (i, j1, q
w
i,j1
)
≻(i, j2, 1) ≻ (i, j2, 2) ≻ · · · ≻ (i, j2, q
w
i,j2
)
≻ · · ·
...
where qwi,j denotes the maximum number of working hours accepted by worker wi in
firm fj. Similarly, for each firm fj , if there is a preference ranking wi1 ≻ wi2 ≻ · · ·
among the workers, then we extend it to the preference ranking
(i1, j, 1) ≻ (i1, j, 2) ≻ · · · ≻ (i1, j, q
f
i1,j
)
≻(i2, j, 1) ≻ (i2, j, 2) ≻ · · · ≻ (i2, j, q
f
i2,j
)
≻ · · ·
...
where qfi,j denotes the maximum number of working hours accepted by firm fj for
worker wi. Once a stable set S found, the number of working hours of worker wi
in firm fj is the biggest integer k such that (i, j, k) ∈ S.
5. More complex examples
We illustrate in this section the strength and flexibility of our theorems and
algorithms by solving some more complex problems.
We consider the following modeling issue. We are given a finite number of
workers wi, firms fj and days dk (days of a week or days of a month for instance).
Each worker may work at one or several firms per day, maybe at different firms on
different days. Similarly, each firm may hire a given number of workers per day,
maybe differents numbers on different days.
A contract is by definition a triple (wi, fj , dk) meaning that worker wi is hired
by firm fj for day dk, and we are looking for an acceptable set of contracts, subject
to various requirements of both workers and firms. Thus, each worker wi
• may exclude some firm–day pairs (fj, dk) considered unacceptable;
• has a strict preference ordering among the remaining firm–day pairs;
• may put some other restrictions, such as
– to set a maximum quota qwi of accepted firm–day pairs;
– not to work on day dk at more than a given number q
w
i,k of firms;
– or not to work at firm fj more than a given number q˜
w
i,j of days.
Similarly, each firm fj
• may exclude some worker–day pairs (wi, dk) considered unacceptable;
• has a strict preference ordering among the remaining worker–day pairs;
• may put some other restrictions, such as
– to set a maximum quota qfj of worker–day pairs for hiring;
– not to hire on day dk more than a given number q
f
j,k of workers;
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– or not to hire worker wi for more than a given number q˜
f
i,j of days.
Remarks 5.1.
(a) Although we keep strict preference ordering on worker-day pairs or on firm-
day pairs, these preference ordering are not sufficient to characterize the
choice map of each agent: they also depend on the quota system.
(b) In most applications we may assume that a worker does not work at more
than one firm per day, so that qwi,k = 1 for every k; then qi means the
maximum number of working days for the worker wi.
5.1. First problem. Assume that we have four workers w1, w2, w3, w4 and three
firms f1, f2, f3. Each worker may work at most at one firm per day, maybe
at different firms on different days of the week. The further requirements of the
agents are listed below.
• Worker w1 can work at most 4 days per week, with the following strict
preference order of the firm–day pairs (fj , dk) where we write (j, k) instead
of (fj , dk) for brevity:
(2, 1) ≻ (3, 1) ≻ (2, 2) ≻ (3, 2) ≻ (2, 3) ≻ (3, 3) ≻ (2, 4) (5.1)
≻(3, 4) ≻ (2, 5) ≻ (3, 5) ≻ (2, 6) ≻ (3, 6) ≻ (2, 7) ≻ (3, 7).
This list shows for instance that worker w1 prefers most to be hired by firm
f2 for Mondays (d1), then by firm f3 always for Mondays, next by firm f2
for Tuesdays (d2), and so on. The absence of firm f1 in the list shows that
worker w1 refuses to be hired by that firm.
• Worker w2 can work at most 3 days per week, with the following strict
preference order:
(1, 1) ≻ (1, 2) ≻ (1, 3) ≻ (1, 4) ≻ (1, 5) ≻ (1, 6) ≻ (1, 7) (5.2)
≻(2, 1) ≻ (2, 2) ≻ (2, 3) ≻ (2, 4) ≻ (2, 5) ≻ (2, 6) ≻ (2, 7)
≻(3, 1) ≻ (3, 2) ≻ (3, 3) ≻ (3, 4) ≻ (3, 5) ≻ (3, 6) ≻ (3, 7).
• Worker w3 can work at most 2 days per week, with the following strict
preference order:
(2, 2) ≻ (2, 3) ≻ (3, 2) ≻ (3, 3) ≻ (1, 2) ≻ (1, 3) (5.3)
≻(2, 4) ≻ (2, 5) ≻ (2, 6) ≻ (1, 4) ≻ (1, 5) ≻ (1, 6)
≻(3, 6) ≻ (3, 4) ≻ (3, 5).
The list shows in particular that he/she does not work on Mondays (d1)
and Sundays (d7).
• Worker w4 accepts to work on all days of the week, with the following strict
preference order:
(1, 1) ≻ (1, 2) ≻ (1, 3) ≻ (1, 4) ≻ (1, 5) ≻ (1, 6) ≻ (1, 7) (5.4)
≻(2, 1) ≻ (2, 2) ≻ (2, 3) ≻ (2, 4) ≻ (2, 5) ≻ (2, 6) ≻ (2, 7)
≻(3, 1) ≻ (3, 2) ≻ (3, 3) ≻ (3, 4) ≻ (3, 5) ≻ (3, 6) ≻ (3, 7).
• Firm f1 may hire up to 4 workers per day when it is open, with the following
strict preference order of the worker–day pairs (wi, dk) where we write (i, k)
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instead of (wi, dk) for brevity:
(1, 1) ≻ (1, 2) ≻ (1, 3) ≻ (1, 4) ≻ (1, 5) ≻ (1, 6) (5.5)
≻(2, 1) ≻ (2, 2) ≻ (2, 3) ≻ (2, 4) ≻ (2, 5) ≻ (2, 6)
≻(3, 1) ≻ (3, 2) ≻ (3, 3) ≻ (3, 4) ≻ (3, 5) ≻ (3, 6).
The list shows in particular that the firm is closed on Sundays and that it
doesn’t hire worker w4. Otherwise, it prefers most to hire worker w1 for
Mondays, then worker w1 for Tuesdays, and so on.
• Firm f2 may also hire up to 4 workers per day, with the following strict
preference order:
(3, 7) ≻ (3, 6) ≻ (3, 5) ≻ (3, 4) ≻ (3, 3) ≻ (3, 2) ≻ (3, 1) (5.6)
≻(4, 7) ≻ (4, 6) ≻ (4, 5) ≻ (4, 4) ≻ (4, 3) ≻ (4, 2) ≻ (4, 1)
≻(1, 7) ≻ (1, 6) ≻ (1, 5) ≻ (1, 4) ≻ (1, 3) ≻ (1, 2) ≻ (1, 1)
≻(2, 7) ≻ (2, 6) ≻ (2, 5) ≻ (2, 4) ≻ (2, 3) ≻ (2, 2) ≻ (2, 1).
• Firm f3 is closed on Saturdays and Sundays; for the other days it may hire
up to 4 workers per day, with the following strict preference order:
(4, 1) ≻ (4, 2) ≻ (4, 3) ≻ (4, 4) ≻ (4, 5) (5.7)
≻(3, 1) ≻ (3, 2) ≻ (3, 3) ≻ (3, 4) ≻ (3, 5)
≻(2, 1) ≻ (2, 2) ≻ (2, 3) ≻ (2, 4) ≻ (2, 5)
≻(1, 1) ≻ (1, 2) ≻ (1, 3) ≻ (1, 4) ≻ (1, 5).
Our task is to find an acceptable firm-worker assignment and work schedule
under these constraints. For the solution we set
W := {w1, w2, w3, w4}, F := {f1, f2, f3}, D := {d1, . . . , d7}
and we proceed in several steps.
Step 1. For each fixed worker wi we define a revealing choice map Cwi on
{wi} × F ×D by applying Theorem 3.10 with Y := Y
w
i , q := q
w
i , Yn := Y
w
i,n and
qn := q
w
i,n given below. For brevity we write (i, j, k) instead of (wi, fj, dk) in the
preference relations.
• For worker w1 we choose
Y w1 := {w1} × {f2, f3} ×D
representing the set of acceptable firms and days of worker w1, with quota
qw1 = 4 and the following preference relation on Y
w
1 (see (5.1)):
(1, 2, 1) ≻ (1, 3, 1) ≻ (1, 2, 2) ≻ (1, 3, 2) ≻ (1, 2, 3)
≻(1, 3, 3) ≻ (1, 2, 4) ≻ (1, 3, 4) ≻ (1, 2, 5) ≻ (1, 3, 5)
≻(1, 2, 6) ≻ (1, 3, 6) ≻ (1, 2, 7) ≻ (1, 3, 7).
Furthermore, we set
Y w1,k := {w1} × F × {dk} and q
w
1,k = 1 for k = 1, . . . , 7.
• For worker w2 we choose
Y w2 := {w2} × F ×D
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with quota qw2 = 3 and the preference relation
(2, 1, 1) ≻ (2, 1, 2) ≻ (2, 1, 3) ≻ (2, 1, 4) ≻ (2, 1, 5)
≻(2, 1, 6) ≻ (2, 1, 7) ≻ (2, 2, 1) ≻ (2, 2, 2) ≻ (2, 2, 3)
≻(2, 2, 4) ≻ (2, 2, 5) ≻ (2, 2, 6) ≻ (2, 2, 7) ≻ (2, 3, 1)
≻(2, 3, 2) ≻ (2, 3, 3) ≻ (2, 3, 4) ≻ (2, 3, 5) ≻ (2, 3, 6) ≻ (2, 3, 7).
on Y w2 (see (5.2)). Furthermore, we set
Y w2,k := {w2} × F × {dk} and q
w
2,k = 1 for k = 1, . . . , 7.
• For worker w3 we choose
Y w3 := {w3} × F × {d2, . . . , d6}
with quota qw3 = 2 and the preference relation
(3, 2, 2) ≻ (3, 2, 3) ≻ (3, 3, 2) ≻ (3, 3, 3) ≻ (3, 1, 2)
≻(3, 1, 3) ≻ (3, 2, 4) ≻ (3, 2, 5) ≻ (3, 2, 6) ≻ (3, 1, 4)
≻(3, 1, 5) ≻ (3, 1, 6) ≻ (3, 3, 6) ≻ (3, 3, 4) ≻ (3, 3, 5).
on Y w3 (see (5.3)). Furthermore, we set
Y w3,k := {w3} × F × {dk} and q
w
3,k = 1 for k = 1, . . . , 7.
• For worker w4 we choose
Y w4 := {w4} × F ×D
with quota qw4 = 7 and the preference relation
(4, 1, 1) ≻ (4, 1, 2) ≻ (4, 1, 3) ≻ (4, 1, 4) ≻ (4, 1, 5)
≻(4, 1, 6) ≻ (4, 1, 7) ≻ (4, 2, 1) ≻ (4, 2, 2) ≻ (4, 2, 3)
≻(4, 2, 4) ≻ (4, 2, 5) ≻ (4, 2, 6) ≻ (4, 2, 7) ≻ (4, 3, 1)
≻(4, 3, 2) ≻ (4, 3, 3) ≻ (4, 3, 4) ≻ (4, 3, 5) ≻ (4, 3, 6) ≻ (4, 3, 7).
on Y w4 (see (5.4)). Furthermore, we set
Y w4,k := {w4} × F × {dk} and q
w
4,k = 1 for k = 1, . . . , 7.
Step 2. Applying Theorem 3.13 we combine the four choice maps of the preceding
step into a global revealing choice map CW on W × F ×D by setting
CW (A) :=
4⋃
i=1
Cwi (A ∩ ({wi} × F ×D))
for every A ⊂W × F ×D.
Step 3. For each firm fj we define a revealing choice map Cfj on W × {fj} ×D
by applying Theorem 3.10 again, this time with Y := Y fj , q := q
f
j , Yn := Y
f
j,n and
qn := q
f
j,n given below and still writing (i, j, k) instead of (wi, fj , dk) for brevity.
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• For firm f1 we choose
Y f1 := W × {f1} × {d1, . . . , d6}
with quota qf1 = 24 and the following preference relation on Y
f
1 (see (5.5)):
(1, 1, 1) ≻ (1, 1, 2) ≻ (1, 1, 3) ≻ (1, 1, 4) ≻ (1, 1, 5)
≻(1, 1, 6) ≻ (2, 1, 1) ≻ (2, 1, 2) ≻ (2, 1, 3) ≻ (2, 1, 4)
≻(2, 1, 5) ≻ (2, 1, 6) ≻ (3, 1, 1) ≻ (3, 1, 2) ≻ (3, 1, 3)
≻(3, 1, 4) ≻ (3, 1, 5) ≻ (3, 1, 6).
• For firm f2 we choose
Y f2 := W × {f2} ×D
with quota qf2 = 28 and the following preference relation on Y
f
2 (see (5.7)):
(3, 2, 7) ≻ (3, 2, 6) ≻ (3, 2, 5) ≻ (3, 2, 4) ≻ (3, 2, 3)
≻(3, 2, 2) ≻ (3, 2, 1) ≻ (4, 2, 7) ≻ (4, 2, 6) ≻ (4, 2, 5)
≻(4, 2, 4) ≻ (4, 2, 3) ≻ (4, 2, 2) ≻ (4, 2, 1) ≻ (1, 2, 7)
≻(1, 2, 6) ≻ (1, 2, 5) ≻ (1, 2, 4) ≻ (1, 2, 3) ≻ (1, 2, 2)
≻(1, 2, 1) ≻ (2, 2, 7) ≻ (2, 2, 6) ≻ (2, 2, 5) ≻ (2, 2, 4)
≻(2, 2, 3) ≻ (2, 2, 2) ≻ (2, 2, 1).
• For firm f3 we choose
Y f3 := W × {f3} × {d1, . . . , d5}
with quota qf3 = 20 and the following preference relation on Y
f
3 (see (5.7)):
(4, 3, 1) ≻ (4, 3, 2) ≻ (4, 3, 3) ≻ (4, 3, 4) ≻ (4, 3, 5)
≻(3, 3, 1) ≻ (3, 3, 2) ≻ (3, 3, 3) ≻ (3, 3, 4) ≻ (3, 3, 5)
≻(2, 3, 1) ≻ (2, 3, 2) ≻ (2, 3, 3) ≻ (2, 3, 4) ≻ (2, 3, 5)
≻(1, 3, 1) ≻ (1, 3, 2) ≻ (1, 3, 3) ≻ (1, 3, 4) ≻ (1, 3, 5).
Step 4. Applying Theorem 3.13 we combine the three choice maps of the pre-
ceding step into a global revealing choice map CF on W × F ×D by setting
CF (A) :=
3⋃
j=1
Cfj (A ∩ (W × {fj} ×D)) , A ⊂W × F ×D.
Step 5. The choice maps CW and CF satisfy the hypotheses of Theorem 3.7.
Applying the algorithm as described in Remark 3.8 (b) by starting with X0 := X ,
we use a computer program to make the otherwise tedious computation. We obtain
the following worker-optimal stable schedule:
(w1, f2, 1− 4), (w2, f1, 1− 3), (w3, f2, 2− 3), (w4, f2, 1− 7).
The notations means that
• f1 hires worker w2 for Mondays, Tuesdays and Wednesdays;
• f2 hires worker w1 for Mondays, Tuesdays, Wednesdays and Thursdays,
worker w3 for Tuesdays and Wednesdays, and worker w4 for all seven days
of the week;
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• f3 does not hire anybody.
Step 6. Applying the algorithm of Remark 3.8 (b) by starting with Y0 := X we
obtain the same solution. This means that the worker-optimal and firm-optimal
solutions coincide, and that there is a unique stable schedule matching in this case.
The remaining of this section investigates the changes in the solutions if we
modify our requirements in various ways.
5.2. Second problem. If worker w3 accepts to work up to four days per week (so
we change qw3 = 2 to q
w
3 = 4), then the worker-optimal and firm-optimal solutions
still coincide: the stable schedule is given by the list
(w1, f2, 1− 4), (w2, f1, 1− 3), (w3, f2, 2− 5), (w4, f2, 1− 7).
The only change with respect to the preceding case is that f2 now hires w3 for
Thursdays and Fridays, too.
5.3. Third problem. We modify the problem such that f2 hires at most one
worker per day, so that for the construction of the choice map Cf2 we add the extra
conditions
Y f1,k := W × {f2} × {dk} and q
f
1,k = 1 for k = 1, . . . , 7.
The changes are more important. Both the worker-optimal solution and firm-
optimal solutions are given by the list
(w1, f3, 1−4), (w2, f1, 1−3), (w3, f2, 2−3), (w4, f2, 1, 4−7), (w4, f3, 2−3).
5.4. Fourth problem. Now assume that
• firm f1 does not hire any worker for more than two days;
• firm f2 does not hire Worker w1 for more than three days;
• firm f2 does not hire Worker w4 for more than three days either.
We proceed as in Subsection 5.1 but in constructing Cf1 we add the extra con-
ditions
Y˜ fi,1 := {wi} × {f1} ×D and q˜
f
i,1 := 2 for i = 1, 2, 3, 4,
and in constructing Cf2 we add the extra conditions
Y˜ f1,2 := {w1} × {f2} ×D and q˜
f
1,2 := 3,
Y˜ f4,2 := {w4} × {f2} ×D and q˜
f
1,2 := 3.
Now the worker-optimal and firm-optimal stable schedules differ: they are given by
(w1, f2, 2− 4), (w1, f3, 1), (w2, f1, 1− 2), (w2, f2, 3),
(w3, f2, 2− 3), (w4, f2, 5− 7), (w4, f3, 1− 4)
and
(w1, f2, 5− 7), (w1, f3, 1), (w2, f1, 1− 2), (w2, f2, 3),
(w3, f2, 2− 3), (w4, f2, 5− 7), (w4, f3, 1− 4),
respectively.
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6. Concluding remarks
The schedule matching problem extends the standard matching procedure to the
allocation of real numbers (days, hours or quantities) between two separate sets of
agents. The present paper generalizes the notion of schedule matching to allow for
schedule and preference constraints on each side of the market. We demonstrate, by
several example, that the revealing property of the choice maps is the most suitable
one to ensure the existence of stable matchings. We also revisit the mathematical
structure of the matching theory by comparing various definitions of stable sets and
various classes of choice maps.
The generality of our analysis is not only theoretically interesting but is poten-
tially useful in application as well.
In certain, highly-competitive, labor markets employers perceive a shortage of
top-level candidates that lead to hiring strategies intended to hire those who are
believed to be the best. Competition within these paradigms inevitably leads to
ever-evolving, if not escalating, dynamic reactions on both sides in an effort to maxi-
mize overall gain. As intended, the strategy forces the candidates make ever quicker
decisions, before they can know, and weigh, other offers that may be proffered in
the near future. As a consequence, candidates end up having less opportunities
and employers less potential candidates than were originally available in the mar-
ket. This results in sub-optimal matches that spawn a myriad of both observable
and hidden costs on both sides of the market. The eventual failure of this common
strategy ultimately mandates sets of new rules and procedures or market re-design.
The algoritm proposed here could be used as a “clearinghouse” in situations where
quotas are placed by workers on firms and days worked, allowing him to work part-
time for different firms on the same day or on different days, excluding some firms
on some given days or excluding some days of work. In the same manner, the
algorithm is applicable to situations where firms to need to adjust their labor force
on certain days depending on their anticipated activity, or on the requirements
associated to different activities on different days or the same day.
7. Proof of the theorems of Section 3 and supplementary results
First we prove Propositions 3.5 and 3.6. Then we apply them to establish The-
orem 3.7. In the second, independent part of the section we prove Theorems 3.10
and 3.13.
Proof of Proposition 3.5.
(a) Assume that C : 2X → 2X is revealing. Then it is persistent because
C(A) ⊂ A for every choice map.
In order to prove the consistence first we observe that in case C(A) ⊂ B we infer
from our hypothesis C(A) ⊂ B ⊂ A and from the choice map property C(B) ⊂ B
that C(B) ⊂ A. Therefore using (3.7) we have
and
C(B) ⊂ A =⇒ B ∩ C(A) ⊂ C(B)⇐⇒ C(A) ⊂ C(B),
so that C(A) = C(B).
Now assume that C : 2X → 2X is consistent and persistent, and consider two
sets satisfying C(A) ⊂ B. We have to prove that A ∩ C(B) ⊂ C(A).
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Since A ⊂ A ∪B, applying (3.9) we obtain that
A ∩ C(A ∪B) ⊂ C(A). (7.1)
The proof will be completed by showing that C(A ∪B) = C(B).
Using the hypothesis C(A) ⊂ B we deduce from (7.1) that C(A ∪ B) ⊂ B.
Therefore C(A ∪ B) ⊂ B ⊂ A ∪B, and the equality C(A ∪ B) = C(B) follows by
applying (3.8).
(b) If the choice map is consistent, then its idempotence follows by applying
(3.8) with B = C(A). If C is persistent, then applying (3.9) with A = C(B) we get
C(B) ⊂ C(C(B)). The converse inclusion also holds because C is a choice map.
(c) If A ⊂ B, then
R(A) ⊂ R(B)⇐⇒ A \ C(A) ⊂ B \C(B)
⇐⇒ A \ C(A) ⊂ A \ C(B)
⇐⇒ A ∩ C(B) ⊂ C(A). 
Examples 7.1.
(a) Consider a two-point set X = {a, b} and the four choice maps defined by the
following formulae:
A ∅ {a} {b} {a, b}
C1(A) ∅ {a} {b} {a}
C2(A) ∅ ∅ {b} ∅
C3(A) ∅ ∅ ∅ {a, b}
C4(A) ∅ ∅ ∅ {a}
One may readily verify that
• C1 is revealing,
• C2 is persistent but not consistent,
• C3 is consistent but not persistent,
• C4 is not idempotent.
One may check that every idempotent choice map on X is either consistent or
persistent (or both).
(b) Consider a three-point set X = {a, b, c} and the choice map C5 : 2
X → 2X
defined by
C5({a}) = ∅, C5(X) = {b}, C5(A) = A otherwise.
Then C5 is idempotent but neither consistent, nor persistent.
Proof of Proposition 3.6.
(a) Using the idempotence of CW and CF we deduce from (3.12) that
S = CF (SF ) = CF (CF (S)) = CF (S).
(b) Assume that CF is consistent (the other case is similar) set S
′
F := S ∪
(X \ SW ). Then SW ∪ S
′
F = X , SW ∩ S
′
F = S and we still have CW (SW ) = S.
Furthermore, since
CF (SF ) = S ⊂ S
′
F ⊂ SF ,
using the consistence of CF we conclude that CF (S
′
F ) = S.
(c) As we already observed (3.2)–(3.4) imply (3.12). Conversely, (3.12) contains
(3.2); furthermore, by the consistency of CW and CF , (3.12) implies (3.3)–(3.4).
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(d) If S is a stable set, then (3.5)–(3.6) follow from (3.4)–(3.7). Now assume
(3.5) and (3.6). Setting
SW := {x ∈ X : CW (S ∪ {x}) = S} and SF := {x ∈ X : CF (S ∪ {x}) = S}
we have SW ∪ SF = X by (3.6). In view of the consistence it remains to show that
CW (SW ) = S = CF (SF ).
If x ∈ SW \ S, then applying the revealed preference property and using (3.6)
we deduce from the inclusion CW (S ∪ {x}) ⊂ SW that
(S ∪ {x}) ∩ CW (SW ) ⊂ CW (S ∪ {x}) = S
and hence x /∈ CW (SW ). We have thus CW (SW ) ⊂ S. Applying again the revealed
preference property we deduce from this last inclusion that
SW ∩ CW (S) ⊂ CW (SW ).
Since CW (S) = S by (3.5), it follows that S ⊂ CW (SW ), so that finally CW (SW ) =
S. The proof of CF (SF ) = S is similar. 
Proof of Theorem 3.7. Let us introduce the map f : 2X × 2X → 2X × 2X by the
formula
f(A,B) := (X \RF (B), X \RW (A))
where RF , RW denote the rejection maps corresponding to CF and CW . We observe
that 2X × 2X is a non-empty complete lattice with respect to the order relation
(A,B) ≤ (A′, B′)⇐⇒ A ⊂ A′ and B ⊃ B′.
Furthermore, f is monotone with respect to this order relation. Indeed, using the
monotonicity of the rejection maps we have
(A,B) ≤ (A′, B′)⇐⇒ A ⊂ A′ and B ⊃ B′
=⇒ RW (A) ⊂ RW (A
′) and RF (B) ⊃ RF (B
′)
=⇒ X \RF (B) ⊂ X \RF (B
′) and X \RW (A) ⊃ X \RW (A
′)
⇐⇒ f(A,B) ≤ f(A′, B′).
Applying a fixed point theorem of Knaster and Tarski [10], [15], [16] we conclude
that f has at least one fixed point and that the fixed points of f form a complete
lattice. It remains to show that the fixed points of f coincide with the stable sets.
More precisely, in view of Proposition 3.6 it is sufficient to prove that
f(A,B) = (A,B)⇐⇒ A ∪B = X and CW (A) = A ∩B = CF (B).
If f(A,B) = (A,B), then A = X \RF (B) and B = X \RW (A). Since RF (B) ⊂
B, it follows from the first relation that A∪B = X . Furthermore, the first relation
also implies that A is the disjoint union of the sets X \ B and CF (B) and hence
that A∩B ⊂ CF (B) ⊂ A. Since CF is a choice map, we also have CF (B) ⊂ B and
therefore CF (B) = A∩B. The proof of the equality CW (A) = A∩B is analogous.
Conversely, if A ∪B = X and CW (A) = A ∩B = CF (B), then
X \RF (B) = (X \B) ∪ CF (B)
= ((A ∪B) \B) ∪ (A ∩B) = (A \B) ∪ (A ∩B) = A
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and
X \RW (A) = (X \A) ∪ CW (A)
= ((A ∪B) \A) ∪ (A ∩B) = (B \A) ∪ (A ∩B) = B,
so that f(A,B) = (A,B). 
Remark 7.2.
(a) In case X is a finite set, the proof of the theorem provides an efficient algo-
rithm to find a stable set. Starting with (X0, Y0) := X × ∅ we define a sequence
(X1, Y1), (X2, Y2),. . . by the recursive relations
(Xn+1, Yn+1) := (X \RF (Yn), X \RW (Xn)), n = 0, 1, . . . ,
i.e.,
Xn+1 := (X \ Yn) ∪ CF (Yn) and Yn+1 := (X \Xn) ∪ CW (Xn), n = 0, 1, . . . .
Since we have obviously X1 ⊂ X = X0 and Y1 ⊃ ∅ = Y0, by the monotonicity of f
we conclude that
X0 ⊃ X1 ⊃ · · · and Y0 ⊂ Y1 ⊂ · · · .
Since X has only finitely many subsets, there exists an index n such that
(Xn+1, Yn+1) = (Xn, Yn),
and then S := Xn ∩ Yn is a stable set. As a matter of fact, we obtain in this way
the worker-optimal stable set. Similarly, we may construct the firm-optimal stable
set by the same recurrence relations if we start from (X0, Y0) := ∅×X .
(b) If we start with (X0, Y0) := X × ∅, then we obtain X1 = X \ RF (∅) = X
and therefore
X0 = X1, Y1 = Y2, X2 = X3, Y3 = Y4, . . . . (7.2)
This implies that the above algorithm is equivalent to the more economical Gale–
Shapley algorithm. There we start with X0 := X and we compute successively
Y1, X2, Y3, X4, . . .
by using the recursive formulae
Yn+1 := (X \Xn) ∪ CW (Xn) and Xn+1 := (X \ Yn) ∪ CF (Yn).
We stop when we obtainXn−1 = Xn+1 for the first time, and we set S = CW (Xn−1).
Indeed, the equalities (7.2) and Xn−1 = Xn+1 imply that
Xn−1 = Xn = Xn+1 = Xn+2 = · · · and Yn = Yn+1 = Yn+2 = Yn+3 · · · .
Therefore (Xn+1, Yn+1) = (Xn, Yn), and
S = Xn ∩ Yn = Xn−1 ∩ ((X \Xn−1) ∪CW (Xn−1)) = CW (Xn−1).
In the last step we used that CW (Xn−1) ⊂ Xn−1 because CW is a choice map.
Analogously, we may construct the firm-optimal stable set by starting with Y0 :=
X , computing successively X1, Y2, X3, Y4, . . . by the same formulae as above, and
setting S = CF (Yn−1) for the first n such that Yn−1 = Yn+1.
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Examples 7.3.
(a) We cannot replace the revealed preference condition with the substitutes
condition in Theorem 3.7. To show this consider the choice maps CW := C1 and
CF := C2 of Example 7.1 (a) on the set X = {a, b}. Then CW is revealing and CF
is persistent. However, there is no stable set. Indeed, we have CW (S) = S = CF (S)
only if S = ∅ or S = {b}, so that only these two sets are individually rational (see
Remark 3.2). However, S = ∅ is blocked by {b} because
CW (S ∪ {b}) = CF (S ∪ {b}) = {b} 6= S,
and S = {b} is blocked by {a} because
CW (S ∪ {a}) = {a} 6= S and CF (S ∪ {a}) = ∅ 6= S.
Hence none of these sets is stable.
(b) We cannot replace the revealed preference condition with the consistence
in Theorem 3.7 either. To show this consider the choice maps CW := C1 and
CF := C3 of Example 7.1 (a) on the set X = {a, b}. Then CW is revealing and CF
is consistent. However, there is no stable matching. Indeed, we have CW (S) = S =
CF (S) only if S = ∅, so this is the only individually rational set. For S = ∅ the
condition (3.3) is satisfied only if SW = ∅, and then SF = X by (3.2). However,
then CF (SF ) = X 6= S, so that (3.4) fails.
Now we turn to the proofs of Theorems 3.10 and 3.13. They are independent of
the preceding part of the present section.
Proof of Theorem 3.10. The choice map C remains the same if we change each Yn to
Yn ∩ Y in the construction. The choice map does not change either if we complete
the family {Yn} with Y
′ := Y \ ∪Yn corresponding to the quota q
′ := CardY ′.
Without loss of generality we assume henceforth that {Yn} is a partition of Y , i.e.,
Y is the disjoint union of the sets Yn.
Let A,B ⊂ X be two sets satisfying C(A) ⊂ B; we have to show that if yk ∈
A ∩ C(B) for some k, then yk ∈ C(A).
First we establish by induction on j the following inequalities:
Card(Cj(A) ∩ Yn) ≤ Card(Cj(B) ∩ Yn) for all n, j = 0, . . . , k − 1. (7.3)
For j = 0 our claim reduces to the trivial equality 0 = 0. Assuming that the
inequalities hold until some j < k − 1, consider the (unique) index m for which
yj+1 ∈ Ym. For each n 6= m we have
Cj(A) ∩ Yn = Cj+1(A) ∩ Yn and Cj(B) ∩ Yn = Cj+1(B) ∩ Yn
and therefore
Card(Cj+1(A) ∩ Yn) ≤ Card(Cj+1(B) ∩ Yn)
by our induction hypothesis. For n = m the only critical case is when
yj+1 ∈ Cj+1(A) \ Cj+1(B).
Since yj+1 ∈ C(A) implies yj+1 ∈ B and since
CardCj(B) ≤ CardCk−1(B) ≤ q − 1
because yk ∈ C(B) and therefore
CardCk−1(B) = CardCk(B)− 1 ≤ q − 1,
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by the construction this can only happen if
Card(Cj(A) ∩ Ym) ≤ qm − 1 and Card(Cj(B) ∩ Ym) = qm.
But then we have
Card(Cj+1(A) ∩ Ym) = Card(Cj(A) ∩ Ym) + 1
≤ qm
= Card(Cj(B) ∩ Ym)
= Card(Cj+1(B) ∩ Ym)
as required.
Since yk ∈ A ∩ C(B), we have yk ∈ A. Furthermore, since C(A) ⊂ Y and the
sets Yn form a partition of Y , it follows from (7.3) that
CardCk−1(A) = ∪nCard(Ck−1(A) ∩ Yn)
≤ ∪nCard(Ck−1(B) ∩ Yn)
= CardCk−1(B)
= CardCk(B)− 1
≤ q − 1
because Ck(B) \ Ck−1(B) = {yk}.
Furthermore, in case yk ∈ Yn we have
(Ck(B) ∩ Yn) \ (Ck−1(B) ∩ Yn) = {yk}
and therefore
Card (Ck−1(A) ∩ Yn) ≤ Card (Ck−1(B) ∩ Yn)
= Card (Ck(B) ∩ Yn)− 1
≤ qn − 1.
Summarizing, the conditions (3.13)–(3.15) are satisfied and we conclude that
yk ∈ C(A) by construction. This completes the proof. 
Remark 7.4.
(a) The choice map constructed in Theorem 3.10 is consistent even if the sets
Yn∩Y are not disjoint. Indeed, if C(A) ⊂ B ⊂ A, then comparing the construction
of
C0(A) ⊂ C1(A) ⊂ · · · and C0(B) ⊂ C1(B) ⊂ · · · ,
we see that Ck(A) = Ck(B) for every k and therefore C(A) = C(B). The equality
Ck(A) = Ck(B) is obvious for k = 0 because both sides are equal to zero. If it is
true for some k − 1 ≥ 0, then we have yk ∈ Ck(A) if and only if
yk ∈ A,
Card (Ck−1(A) ∪ {yk}) ≤ q
Card ((Ck−1(A) ∪ {yk}) ∩ Yn) ≤ qn for all n,
and yk ∈ Ck(B) if and only if
yk ∈ B,
Card (Ck−1(B) ∪ {yk}) ≤ q
Card ((Ck−1(B) ∪ {yk}) ∩ Yn) ≤ qn for all n.
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Since Ck−1(A) = Ck−1(B) by the induction hypothesis, the equality Ck(A) =
Ck(B) will follow if we show that yk ∈ A⇐⇒ yk ∈ B if the last two conditions are
satisfied. Since C(A) ⊂ B ⊂ A and since C(B) ⊂ B (C is a choice map), we have
and
yk ∈ B =⇒ yk ∈ C(B) =⇒ yk ∈ B =⇒ yk ∈ A.
(b) The range of an idempotent choice map coincides with the set of its fixed
points:
{C(A) : A ⊂ X} = {A ⊂ X : C(A) = A}.
Example 7.5. In Example 7.3 (b) the consistent choice map CF cannot be obtained
by the construction of Theorem 3.10 without the disjointness condition (see Remark
7.4 (a)). A stronger counterexample is the following. We consider a three-point set
X = {a, b, c} and the following two choice maps:
A ∅ {a} {b} {c} {a, b} {a, c} {b, c} {a, b, c}
CW (A) ∅ {a} {b} {c} {a, b} {c} {b, c} {b, c}
CF (A) ∅ {a} {b} {c} {a} {a, c} {b} {a, c}
Both choice maps are defined by the construction of Theorem 3.10. For CW we
take Y = X with the preference order c ≻ b ≻ a and quota q = 2, and we set
Y1 = {a, c} with the quota q1 = 1. This is a revealing choice map. The choice map
CF is the one given in Example 3.12 above: a consistent but not revealing choice
map because the disjointness condition is not satisfied.
In order to find a stable set S we have to cover X = {a, b, c} by two sets SW and
SF satisfying CW (SW ) = S = CW (S) and CF (SF ) = S = CF (S). The equalities
CW (S) = S = CF (S) are satisfied if and only if S has at most one element, so that
there are four candidates for the stable set S. We can see easily from the table that
in order to have CW (SW ) = S = CW (S),
• in case S = ∅ we must have SW = SF = ∅;
• in case S = {a} we must have SW = {a} and SF ⊂ {a, b};
• in case S = {b} we must have SW = {b} and SF ⊂ {b, c};
• in case S = {c} we must have SW ⊂ {a, c} and SF = {c}.
Since SW ∪ SF 6= X in all these cases, we conclude that there is no stable set.
Proof of Theorem 3.13. If C(A) ⊂ B, then setting Ai := A ∩Xi and Bi := B ∩Xi
we have
A ∩ C(B) ⊂ C(A)⇐⇒ (A ∩ C(B)) ∩Xi ⊂ C(A) ∩Xi for all i
⇐⇒ Ai ∩ Ci(Bi) ⊂ Ci(Ai) for all i. 
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